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INTRODUCTION

The Comanche have been cited as having a significantly lower
level of socio-political organization than was prevalent among American
plains cultures.

This situation has been attributed to the Comanche's

pre-equestrian Basin Shoshonean origins.

Hoebel states: "It is not an

understatement to say that the Comanches represented plains culture in
its rudest form and that where it was most rude it was most Shoshonean.
(Hoebel 1940: 129)

This statement argues that the level of Comanche

socio-political organization was set by the persistence of older socio
political organization was set by the persistence of older social
institutions.

However, it represents a departure from the established

views of cultural homogeneity among plains societies.
Also, it is generally accepted that the development and spread of
native equestrian cultures in North America was accomplished without
direct or prolonged contact with European cultures. (Walker 1972: 1-2;
Webb 1931: 52).

The Comanche were an exception to this otherwise

accurate generalization.

They developed into an equestrian culture

under the direct influence of the Spanish.

This early and continuous

Comanche-Spanish contact heavily influenced the Comanche adaptation
to the southern plains.
This tudy examines the socio-political organization of the
Comanche from the perspective of the Comanche-Spanish culture contacts.
The conclusion reached is that the Comanche retention of many basic
Shoshonean socio-political characheristics can be directly linked to
the Comanche-Spanish contact situation. More specifically, it will

1
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be shown that the Comanche quickly developed a predatory raiding
economy at the expense of the Spanish— by which some Comanche bands
supplemented the more typical Southern Plains buffalo hunting economy;
while for other bands raiding became the major form of subsistence.
In both cases, raiding was a cultural strategy which allowed the Comanche
a degree of adaptive flexibility not available to the central and northern
plains tribes.
The argument presented here refers to only one contact situation.
Nevertheless, it suggests that such conditions may have developed in other
areas with similar results.

There is ample evidence that other American

Indian societies developed or intensified raiding activities against
Europeans as well as native populations after European contact.

The

effect on the socio-political development of such raiding adaptations
has not been clearly defined.

This may be partially attributed to an

over-emphasis placed in acculturation studies on the modification or
disintegration of native cultures under direct or prolonged contact
with technologically superior European cultures.
negate the fact that this is the imminent result.

This study does not
Rather, the point

is that in the initial stages of culture contact, the technologically
inferior culture may seek out and exploit the weaknesses of the tech
nologically superior culture in such a manner that the native socio
political system reflects an exploitive adaptation to the European
culture.

The degree to which other cultures have similarly adapted

to European contact can only be determined by careful reevaluation of
their circumstances.
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OVERVIEW OF PLAINS CULTURE

To facilitate a clearer understanding of the Comanche culture, it
is necessary to briefly outline the current interpretations of plains
culture, as well as to define how the Comanche differed from the general
plains cultural pattern.
To a great extent our understanding of plains Indian society has been
influenced by the culture area concept developed by Clark Wissler (1938)
and further refined by A.L. Kroeber (1947).

With respect to the develop

ment of theoretical constructs, both scholars were cognizant of the influ
ence the environment had in the evolution of plains cultures.

However,

both treated the plains geographic areas as a single environmental zone.
Similarly, they focused on plains societies as a homogenized cultural whole.
While this generalized approach fulfills the scientific principals of theory
development, the details of social organization and cultural micro-evolution
become lost in generalizations about whole culture areas.
The most recent attempt to categorize groups in the plains culture
area on an ecological-socio-political basis is that of Oliver (1962).
Oliver agrues that the plains equestrian cultures, which were either
preequestrian hunters and gatherers or horticulturists, developed similar
socio-political patterns in their adaptation to the plains environment.
The key factors in their adaptation, according to Oliver as well as Wissler
and Kroeber, were the acquisition of the horse and the seasonal movement
of the horse and the seasonal movement of the buffalo.

Oliver also demon

strates that the differences between plains societies can be explained in
their preequestrian origins; i.e., forming, hunting and gathering, or in
3
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ecological idiosyncrasies.

The case for the Comanche is explained as a

combination of these two variables, their Shoshonean socio-political
origin and the environmental conditions of the southern plains.
Just how the Comanche differed can best be illustrated by using the
seven variables on which Oliver based his arguments.

These variables are:

1.) summer tribal congregations and winter dispersal in bands; 2.) police
organizations for the regulation of summer hunts; 3.) age-graded societies;
4.) status and prestige acquired through warfare and hunting; 5.) leadership;
6. ) councils; and 7.) clans.

Oliver found that with minor structural vari

ations, all plains tribes either elaborated on or modified their preequestrain
socio-political organization to conform to the above variables.

In other

words, some tribes developed police organizations where none had existed.
Other tribes having clan systems modified them to facilitate winter dispersal
in bands.
The Comanche stand out as significantly different in their plains
adaptation in that for all practical purposes: 1.) they did not show the
characteristic pattern of tribal congregations in summer and dispersal
into fragmental bands during winter; 2.) they did not develop the otherwise
universal plains institution of the communal hunt police; and 3.) they did
not develop sodalities or associations (Oliver 1962: 71).
The explanations offered for the low level of Comanche socio-political
organization are of two kinds.

First, cultural persistence— the Comanches'

cultural roots were of Shoshonean origin.

For example, Wallace and Hoebel

write that "The Comanche band was strikingly similar in organization to
the aboriginal Shoshonean groups of the Great Basin in the days preceding
White contact." (1952: 22).

The explanation here is that to a great
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extent the Comanche had retained their pre-equestrian socio-political
organization after moving into the southern plains.

While cultural

continuity does illustrate the level of Comanche socio-political organiza
tion, it does not isolate or explain the variables which allowed the
Comanche to dominate the southern plains without drastic alteration of
their basic Shoshoean social structure.
The second explanation is ecological:

the contention that the

environment of the southern plains was less demanding than the northern
plains insofar as the severity of the northern winters made (the summer
communal hunt, the summer tribal congregation, as the hunt police and the
winter dispersals) an adaptive necessity for the northern tribes.

The

southern plains, on the other hand, offered less severe winters and contained
more buffalo year round, thus providing less strigent adaptive pressures
on the Comanche (Colson 1954: 13-14).
This explanation has some validity, but an analysis of southern plains
climatic conditions and buffalo havits and distribution points out that
the adaptive pressures of the south were or should have been just as
demanding as those characteristic of the northern plains.

Existing data

on buffalo population and habits indicate that they did not make annual
migrations of a patterned nature.

Rather, the distribution and population

of the herds remained relatively constant in any given area throughout
the year.

The herds moved in irregular patterns in response to local con

ditions of grass and water.

These patterns were so irregular that the plains

tribes often had trouble finding the herds (McHugh 1972: 173-175).

The only

conclusive evidence for herd migration involves just the northern and
southern extremes of the buffalo range.

In both instances the herds would
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largely abandon these areas, but only during the severest weather.

In the

north, the herds would shift southward to avoid the worst winter weather.
The extreme southern herds would range northward during the summer to
escape the heat and the lack of grass (Allen 1377: 465).
These arid conditions are further substantiated by Levy's study of
the southern plains environment.

He states:

Water appears to have been a less stable element and it
is here that some of the differences between the north
and south plains are made clear. High winds throughout
the plains made for a generally high evaporation rate,
but higher temperatures in the south made the area below
the Arkansas (River extremely drought-prone. (Levy 1962: 20).

There is clear evidence that the Texas plains were abandoned by the
buffalo during the summer months (Allen 1877: 465).
response to this shows that by 1854 the Comanche,

The evidence on tribal

as well asthe

Kiowa,

had to move as far north as the Arkansas River to find buffalo(Allen
1877: 525-527).

The Arkansas River represents the northern limits of the

Comanche territory (Richardson 1933: 47; Jablow 1950: 80).
From this evidence it may be inferred that while the winters may have
been less severe, making more buffalo available on the southern plains
during the cold months, the drought-prone environment and its influence
on buffalo movement should have made a summer communal hunt and a hunt
police of prime importance to the Comanche.

The question is clearly

raised by Oliver:
If all of the true plains tribes developed these
institutions in response to a shared ecological
situation, then there is the clear implication that
the Comanche did not share precisely the same
situation, or else that they developed different
techniques for coping with the situation. (Oliver 1962: 73).
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The Comanche occupied a wide expanse of territory, including parts of
Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Kansas and Oklahoma (Richardson 1931: 18-21).
This territory, according to Oliver, does not represent a single environ
mental zone, but rather a collection of micro-environmental areas to
which individual Comanche bands adapted.

He contends that not all Comanche

were true plains people because not all were living on the plains or were
seriously involved with the buffalo.

He further indicates that some Comanche

bands were more involved with horses than the plains people, and that large
horse herds and the use of horses for food compensated the adaptive pressures
for some of the Comanche bands.

Consequently, the development of a more

structured socio-political organization was unnecessary (Oliver 1962: 73-74) .
His assumptions are correct insofar as they point out the environmental
variations within the territory occupied by the Comanche, but his conclusion
falls back on the retention of preequestrian heritage as the primary cause
of the Comanches' lack of socio-political organization.

He states:

We may say that the evidence strongly suggests that the
differences between the Comanche and the other true plains
tribes were primarily due to cultural background of the
Comanche, although ecological considerations were also
factors in the sense that they permitted these variations
to survive.
(Oliver 1962: 75)
Oliver's interpretations of the micro-environmental conditions of
the southern plains and the use of horses as food were important factors
in understanding Comanche adaptation, but neither of these explanations
accounts for how the Comanche were able to dominate the southern plains
without drastic alteration of their Shoshonean socio-political organization.
The adaptation of any society to an environment necessitates an adap
tion to other cultures which occupy the same environment or adjacent areas,

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission

8

and which through political, economic or military activites influence the
conditions of that environment.

The one "ecological" condition not taken

into account by Oliver and other students of plains culture is the influence
of the Spanish on Comanche adaptation.

The argument presented here is that

there were two important variables which heavily influenced the Comanche
economic and socio-political adaptation.

These are, first, the Spanish

foreign policy, its structural weaknesses and the resulting conditions it
perpetuated.

And second, the development, modifications and expansion of

native and Spanish trade networks.
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SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY

During the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain, along with the major
European powers, embarked on a world-wide exploration and expansion
program.

Spanish foreign policy at this time was fourfold:

conquer,

convert, exploit, and incorporate the native population.
Spain’s policy in the New World was guided by a theory of govern
ment, similar to Roman imperialism, coupled with a religious ideal.
In essence, this meant that all power and decisions were controlled and
regulated by the central government.

Spain's immediate goals were to

conquer territory, incorporate it into the Spanish state, and render
the natives useful to the government (Webb 1931: 88).
The major implement of conquest was the conquistador, the general
and his army, who made initial contact with the indigenous population
and conquered them if necessary.

After subdueing the native population,

a provincial government, not unlike a European feudal system, was
initiated to maintain control and exact tribute for the government.
Equally important to Spanish economic policy was the missionary
zeal of the Universal Church.

Missions were established in all new

territories as soon as provincial governments were established.

The

natives were expected or forced to finance and maintain these institutions
through tribute and labor.

Total conversion to Christianity was the

ultimate goal, and the church made regular use of the military in
attempting to accomplish it (Webb 1931: 87-88).
There were two major factors which influenced this situation,
factors which had important ramifications in the development of the
9
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early Apache and later Comanche people. First, Indians of the Sourthern
plains did not have the readily exploitable wealth the Spanish had
extracted from South and Central American civilizations.

The economy

of the Southwest Pueblos offered little in the way of valuable tribute,
and the Southern plains offered even less.

In essence, there were

insufficient local resources and wealth to support the imperialistic
system of Spain.

Consequently, Spain had only a minor economic interest

in the Southern plains.

Secondly, the small number of pedestrain Apache

bands scattered throughout the vastness of the Southern plains would
have made conquest extremely difficult under the existing Spanish
economic and military system. (Webb 1931: 88).
Spanish military power during the early stages of occupation was
confined to the conquistador.

But, as provincial governments developed

and small numbers of Spanish settlers moved into the area, other methods
of defending the missions and settlements were devised.

Prior to the

Pueblo revolt of 1680, these military forces were comprised of citizensoldiers who served without salary.

They performed escort duty, acted

as guards for their own towns and during emergencies assumed command
of the mobilized citizens. (Simmons 1968: 112).

The revolt of 1680

underscored the necessity of a stronger military structure and permanent
garrisons were authorized.

Each local garrison was required, by

regulations, to man a total complement of fifty-seven soldiers, including
officers and Indian scouts.
never had a full command.

In actual practice, however, most garrisons
Training of individual recruits was regulated,

but the actual amount each soldier received varied from garrison to
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garrison.

Arms and equipment were supplied by the government with the

individual soldier paying a percentage from his own pay.

Officers were

either regular army men transferred from Mexico City, or private
soldiers who had risen through the ranks.

Adequate traning and leadership

qualities were often lacking in commissioned colonials, while officers
from the regular army often looked down on their men and bemoaned their
own misfortune at being assigned to frontier duty.

Maintaining

arms and equipment was a problem on the frontier since firearms and
ammunition had to be requisitioned from Mexico City.

Because of this

the colonial soldier depended more upon the shield, armor, lance and
sword, than firearms.

In terms of technological efficiency, these

weapons were not much better than those used by the plains tribes.
Another problem was the lack of coordination and communication between
provinces and garrisons.

Each province was responsible for defending

its own border and was rarely capable of mounting a coordinated campaign
with others. (Faulk and Brinckerhoff 1966: 30-34).
Overall effectiveness of the Spanish frontier army was poor and
offered little in the way of protection against raiding plains Indians.
The Spanish were able to maintain military dominance before the
Comanche arrival only because the Spanish policy forbid the sale of
guns and annumition to native populations; and, by tightly controlling
the sale of horses they were able to maintain mobility over the
pedestrian plains Apache.
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SPANISH-APACHE RELATIONSHIP

In 1589 the first permanent Spanish settlement was established in
New Mexico (Bolton 1916: 226).

From this point on, Spain began system

atically to carry out their imperialistic policy among the Pueblos of
New Mexico.

Their success was due to the completely sedentary economy

of the Pueblos.

The Pueblos had little of value except their

crops, which the Spanish plundered so extensively that many Pueblo
villages were reduced to starvation (Kenner 1969: 12).

Frustrated by

the lack of wealth in the Rio Grande area, the Spanish began to seek
other avenues of profit.

The long standing trade between the Plains

and Pueblos had been temporarily stopped by Spanish conquest of the
Pueblo area, but soon reopened with the Spanish as controlling agents.
The major center for this trade was the Pueblo of Taos, although most
Pueblos and newly established Spanish settlements conducted trade with
plains Apache (Kenner 1969: 14).

Spanish presence and the introduction

of European goods stimulated trade between the plains Apache and Pueblos
to a point it had never reached prior to contact.
able to acquire a wide variety of Spanish goods:

The Apache were now
knives, axes, saber

blades to be used as lance points, iron arrow heads, a wide variety of
trinkets, jewelry, cloth, clothing and cooking pots as well as the
traditional native commodities.
The initial relationship between the Spanish and the Apache was
generally friendly.

The Apaches needed the Pueblo trade as an outlet

for their dressed skins and hides (Kenner 1969: 16).

The Spanish

held no interest in the plains region nor did its inhabitants possess
12
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any wealth, other tnan buffalo hides and meat which were more eas
obtained through trade than by force.
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THE SLAVE TRADE

Slavery was an integral part of Spanish imperialism and had been
practiced since contact.
after Spanish conquest.

Many Pueblo people had been sold into slavery
Once provincial governments were formed and

trade with the plains Apache reestablished, the Spanish accepted and
encouraged the buying of captives taken by Apache raiding parties. The
Spanish, concerned more with making a profit, tended to ignore the origin
of Apache captives.

While most captives offered for sale by the Apache

were Caddoan prisoners taken in raids east of the southern plains, many
Pueblo settlements under the direct rule and supposed protection of Spain
found themselves attacked by Apache raiders.

As Spanish holdings in

Mexico and the Southwest grew, the demand for slave labor increased.
Provincial governments began to subsidize the profitable traffic in slaves
Luis de Rosas, Governor of New Mexico in 1637, sent expeditions into the
plains to capture hostile Apaches to be sold into slavery.

By 1661 the

slave trade had become so profitable that Spanish traders were seeking
every opportunity to capture Apaches, even as they traded peacefully
at the Pueblos. (Kenner 1969: 15-18).
While the increase in slave raiding caused a great deal of resent
ment among the Pueblos and Apaches, there was little outright hostility
toward the Spanish.

The Apaches did raid Spanish settlements periodically

but the lure of Spanish trade goods kept Apache hostility at a minimum.
Another factor in the coninued Spanish-Apache trade relationship was the
latter's desire for Spanish horses.

The first recorded account of the

Spanish trading horses to the Apache was in the 1650's. (Kenner 1967: 16).
14
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While the Apaches may have acquired horses in limited numbers before this
period, it is doubtful that they possessed enough horses to have attained
the mobility necessary to compete with the mounted Spanish soldiers.
Spanish imperialistic policy had been able to maintain a degree of
superiority over the sedentary Pueblos by maintaining garrisons and
demanding tribute in the form of agricultural products and in controlling
the trade with the plains Apache which kept the Pueblo economy at a minimum.
By keeping tight control of the horse trade, the Spanish were able to
retain the advantage of military mobility over the pedestrian Apache.

The

Apache desire for horses is well illustrated by the unsuccessful 1650 plan
which the Pueblos devised to rid themselves of Spanish oppression.

The

Apaches agreed to aid the Pueblos in their rebellion in return for the
horse herds owned by the Spanish. (Kenner 1969: 15-16).

The discontent

of the Pueblos and Apaches culminated in 1680 with a carefully planned
and successfully executed rebellion— the so-called Pueblo Revolt— which
quickly drove the Spanish from New Mexico.

The Apaches were also involved

in the uprising and were also involved in the uprising and were present
at the siege of Santa Fe.

Their resentment against the Spanish slave

policy is reflected by their demand for the release of all Apache slaves
in Santa Fe before the Spanish were allowed to withdraw.(Kenner 1969: 19).
The Spanish left behind most of their property, including extensive horse
herds which subsequently fell into the hands of the Apache.

Spain recon

quered New Mexico in 1693, and reestablished their former governmental
and trade policies.
From 1693 until the arrival of the Comanche in 1705, the Spanish had
few troubles with either the Pueblos or the Apache.

One factor responsible
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for the lack of hostility on the part of the Apache was their recent
development of a semi-sedentary horticultural economy.

During the

Apache's long association with the Pueblos they had learned the techni
ques of oasis farming and at some point in these years began to raise
their own crops.

The first recorded evidence of Apache farming was in

1694 (Kenner 1969: 21).

This development resulted in a switch from their

former nomadic hunting economy to a sedentary spring and summer farming
phase.

It is quite probable that this change in the Apache subsistence

economy coincided with the Pueblo revolt of 1680 and the resulting increase
of horses available to the Apache.

Since the horse increased mobility

and hunting efficiency, there was more time available to raise the food
which they had previously had to steal or trade.
Two important pre-Comanche, post-Spanish factors have been emphasized—
factors which were of major importance to the Comanche adaptation and exploi
tation of the sourthern plains.

First, the agricultural economy of the

New Mexico Pueblos and the inadequate wealth, by Spanish standards, of the
southern plains made the Spanish form of feudal system unworkable: Therefore,
the area was of only secondary importance to their expansion program.
This had a direct effect on the financial support the southwest frontier
provinces received from Mexico City, and negatively affected provincial
governments and military efficiency.

Secondly, the Spanish introduction

of European trade goods, horses, and the development of a large scale market
for slaves which would ultimately provide the motive for, and the perpetu
ation of, the Comanche raiding economy.
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COMANCHE-APACHE RELATIONSHIP

The Comanche made their first recorded visit to Taos in 1705.

They

were reported to have attended an annual trade fair in the company of
their Ute relatives who were regular visitors at the Pueblos (Richardson
1933: 55).

The Comanche were reported to have been forced from their

northern homeland by northeastern tribes who had acquired guns through
the French and English.

Their movement onto the Southern plains, however,

was facilitated by their desire for Spanish horses which they had acquired
in limited number (Wallace and Hoebel 1964: 10; Richardson 1933: 19).
While it is clear that by 1760 some Comanche bands were being pushed
south by better armed tribes it is probable that the initial Comanche
movement south was primarily due to the desire for horses.

Within one

year of their arrival along with their Ute allies, they were raiding Apache
farming settlements (Thomas 1935: 60).

Undoubtedly there were two reasons

for the Comanche's rapid development of a raiding pattern.
most important reason was the Comanche desire for horses.

The first and
They had been

Shoshonean pedestrian hunters and gatherers with a subsistence economy,
and a level of social organization not far above a nuclear or extended
family band.

They had come to recognize the value of the horse as a means

of transportation and power.

Spanish control of the horse trade was

tightly regulated, and the early Comanche did not have the wealth to
purchase horses.

The logical avenue open was to steal them.

Spanish

military efficiency, while far from being fully effective, was still a
formidable barrier to a pedestrian group such as the early Comanche.

The

Apache, however, did possess large numbers of horses and were easier prey
17
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due to their sedentary horti-cultural adaptation.

Raiding small isolated

farming settlements offered better chances for success than relatively
large and garrisoned Spanish settlements.

The accepted explanation for

the rapid Comanche displacement of the Apache has been attributed to the
sedentary adaptation of the Apache, which gave the nomadic Comanche a
definite advantage.

The Comanche could mass an overwhelming number of

warriors against isolated farming settlements, while Apache retaliation
was hindered by not knowing where the nomadic Comanche could be found
(Secoy 1966: 30-31).
Undoubtedly these early raids were small scale raiding expeditions,
similar to the generalized raiding pattern which became predominant
during the late 18th and 19th centuries.

A few men travelling by foot

would enter an enemy camp at night and drive off as many animals as
possible.

This form of raiding rarely resulted in many casualties to

either the raiders or their enemies.

The Comanche quickly elaborated

on this pattern and began systematically to attack Apache settlements.
The motive for these attacks has been attributed to the Comanche desire
to take and hold the southern plains (Richardson 1933: 19).

Though this

was the end result, the real objective was less grand than a conceptualized
plan of conquest.

Several factors prompt this conclusion.

First, it is

doubtful that the socio-political organization of the Comanche was capable
of such a concentrated effort.

They exhibited no such organizational

tendencies during their dominance of the southern plains.

Secondly, the

initial Comanche attacks were in northeastern New Mexico on the extreme
western edge of the buffalo range.

As late as 1719, those Apache occupying

the plains of eastern Colorado, north of the Arkansas river had no knowledge

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the Comanche (Hyde 1969: 64-65).

The obvious implication being that

the Comanches southward migration was west of the major buffalo range.
Obviously, horses and Spanish trade goods provided the initial interest
for the Comanche southward movement and subsequent attacks on the Apache.
The Comanche had been aware of the Spanish slave trade since their arrival,
and they were quick to recognize the value of captives.

The outright

attacks on the Apache were concentrated, though individualized attempts
on the part of the Comanche to secure captives who were valuable and
marketable trade items.

The Spanish had never been overly concerned with

who supplied captives for sale, so the Comanche quickly became involved
in the growing slave trade, at the expense of the Apache population.
With the horse and captives as major objectives, the defeat of the Apache
was considerably hastened.
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SPANISH RESPONSE TO COMANCHE INVASION

The Apache sought the aid of the Spanish, but the Spanish made no
positive move against the Comanche even after they attacked Taos in
1716 and carried off several captives (Richardson 1933: 55).

By 1719

Comanche raids were interferring with Spanish trade (Tomas 1935: 104-105).
The Apache were the principal trading partners of the Spanish and the
continous Comanche attacks made the accumulation of items the Spanish
accepted in trade difficult.

The Spanish economy was heavily dependent

upon Indian trade in buffalo hides and slaves which were exchanged in
Mexico for manufactured goods not produced in the provinces (Kenner 1969: 40).
With their economy at stake the Spanish were prompted into action.
In September of’ 1719, a force of 600 men under the command of Governor
Valverdi took the field in search of the Comanche.

They reported the

destruction of Apache settlements as well as the capture of sixty-four
women and children from one settlement, but they were unable to find the
Comanche (Thomas 1935: 113-115).

Not being able to locate the Comanche

was a continuous problem faced by Spanish military expeditions.

During

the Spanish occupation, a major factor in their military inefficiency
was the lack of experience and information on the plains.

One reason

for this lack of experience was a Spanish law which forbade traders
from transporting goods to the plains tribes (Kenner 1969: 36). Undoubtedly,
the purpose for this law was to maintain tight control of what was being
traded to the Indians and to insure that the provincial government received
its share of the profits.
20
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THE FRENCH THREAT

More alarming to the Spanish were reports of French soldiers
fighting side by side with the Pawnee.

The Apache also indicated the

existence of an extensive French gun trade, and further embelished the
story by including tales of two large French towns in the vicinity of
the Platte River (Thomas 1935: 143-144).
The Spanish had long been aware of rumors that the French were
trading with tribes along the eastern periphery of the southern plains.
As early as 1695 the Plains Apache had complained that the French were
supplying their enemies with guns (Folmer 1953: 277).

Undoubtedly

the Apache were perpetuating these rumors in hopes the Spanish would
reverse their ban on trading guns to the Indians.

In fact, there had

been French traders in that area— a small number of them had traveled
from the French settlement in Illinois in 1719 to make contact with the
Pawnee. They were bringing guns to trade but had lost most of them to the
Osage while travelling through their country.

The French reached the

Pawnee and traded two guns for horses; the Pawnee already had six guns
in their possession, which the French reported were highly valued.

The

French found the Pawnee unfrie idly and quickly departed for Illinois
(Hyde 1959: 73). The Apache stories of a gun trade were partially true,
but hardly could be called extensive or constant.
The French soldiers and towns were pure imagination.

The reaction

to these rumors clearly illustrate the state of Spanish governmental
and military inefficiency which the Comanche were soon to capitalize on.
By the time Valverdi returned to Santa Fe and filed his reports, the
21
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French activity had grown to a military force of 6,000 men located twohundred leagues from New Mexico and drawing closer each day.

The dis

patch pleaded for weapons and supplies to combat the French army, and quite
significantly pointed out that the entire New Mexican defense force
numbered only three hundred thirty-eight men, with an inadequate inventory
of serviceable arms (Thomas 1935: 147).

The reaction in Mexico City was

to suggest that a Spanish detachment of twenty to twenty-five men be
stationed north of the Arkansas River, to guard New Mexico against the
French.

They also ordered Valverdi to send an expedition into the area

to reconnoiter the French positions.
The
garrison

New Mexican officials were

opposed to the order

of a small

so far from Santa Fe, but the expedition to reconnoiter the

area was sent under the command of Governor Valverdi's second-in-command,
Lieutenant Colonel Pedro de Villasur.

His command consisted of forty-two

Spanish soldiers, three Spanish settlers, and sixty Pueblo Indians
(Hyde 1959: 74). Villasurs expedition was attacked by a Pawnee and Oto
force near the Platte River.
were killed.

Thirty-five Spanish and twelve Pueblo Indians

The survivors scattered and eventually reached New Mexico

(Hyde 1959: 76-77).
By modern standards this engagement seems small, but the loss of
thirty-five men and their equipment was a serious blow to a defense force
of less than four hundred men.
The

Comanche continued to raid

the Apache, growning

richier

and captives with every attack.

The Apache continued to plead for help

and the Spanish filled reports.

In 1724 Governor Juan Domingo de Buslamante
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visited several Apache villages and reported the destruction of villages,
and capture of woman and children (Thomas 1935: 201).

Buslamante recom

mended the establishment of a garrison to protect the Apache and guard
the frontier, but authorization was denied.

By 1726 Apaches had abandoned

their villages and had scattered, some to Taos, others to the Navahos
(Thomas 1935: 216).
The Spanish pattern of response during the initial phase of the
Comanche invasion was largely confined to attempts at relocating the
harassed Apache in permanent settlements near Taos and Santa Fe.

Military

aid, except for a few reconnaissance expeditions, was non-existent.

The

New Mexican authorities had continually requested more military supplies
and personnel, but their requests had repeatedly been denied.

Undoubtedly

the central government in Mexico City was reluctant to spend funds to
improve the military structure of a province which provided so little
revenue to the crown.

By relocating the Apache close to the settlements,

tributes could be collected which would increase the governmental profits,
and the heathen Apache would be under the direct influence of the Church
which would hasten their conversion; both were central to the Spanish
theory of government.

All the Spanish succeeded in doing, however, was

to allow the Comanche unrestricted access to the southern plains and the
New Mecican settlements.
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COMANCHE TRADE

Since their arrival in 1705 the Comanche had regularly attended
the New Mexican trade fairs.

They brought buffalo hides, meat and Apache

captives to trade for a variety of Pueblo and Spanish goods.

The Pueblo

offered largely agricultural products, while the Spanish offered a wide
range of goods including knives, awls, axes, saber blades, needles cooking
utensils and various other items such as cloth, ribbon and beads.
The Comanche conduct at these fairs was generally peaceful, but there
are reports that occasionally they helped themselves to Spanish horses.
A 1719 report from Santa Fe complained that the Comanche took advantage
of this "peace" to steal horses and commit murder (Thomas 1935: 104).
A later report published in 1736 stated that "a 'barbarious' warlike nation
called the Comanches always on the move" appeared annually in New Nexico
to barter and then disappeared, not to be seen again until the next trading
season (Wallace quoted in Kenner 1969: 36)

Though there were some minor

incidents, the Comanche made few raids againct the Spanish during the first
three decades they were on the southern plains.

Obviously, the Apache were

easier prey and the Spanish were the only practical source of trade goods.
Consequently, the Comanche were careful to keep hostilities toward the
Spanish at a minimum.
By 1730 the Comanche had pushed the Apache south and west into the
New Mexican mountains.
Southern plains.

They were virtually in control of most of the

It appears however, that as late as 1730 their main camps

were in the Colorado plains, adjacent the the Arkansas River.

They occupied

this area and sent raiding parties southward to attack the retreating Apache
24
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(Hyde 1959: 97-98).

This would indicate that the early Comanche found

this area especially suited to their needs, and were not particularly
interested in occupying tne vast area to the south.

The Colorado plains

had abundant buffalo since this area could be considered the Southern
borders of the central plains.

Most important this region was centrally

located making it ideal for trade with both New Mexico and north among
their Shoshonean relatives.
The Comanche must have become involved in the Northern horse trade
very quickly after their arrival, since the northern Shoshone acquired
their first horses soon after the turn of the 18th century.

During this

early semi-equestrian phase the Shoshone confined the use of horses to
hunting, since their limited supply was too valuable to use in war or to
transport batgage.

By the mid-1740's, the Shoshone had enough horses to

be considered totally equestrian (Secoy 1953: 36-37).
This gradual equestrian evolution among the Shoshone corresponds to
the basic pattern of Comanche displacement of the Apache.

The Comanche’s

initial attacks on the Apache provided sufficient mounts for themselves
with a small surplus which were filtered north.

With the stimulation of

a constant demand for horses by their northern relatives, the Comanche
escalated their attacks to provide the excess needed to maintain the trade.
The Shoshone were faced with providing an adequate commodity of
exchange.

Buffalo hides were unsatisfactory since they were not particularly

valuable and transporting a sufficient amount presented a problem.

The

willingness of the Comanche to accept war captives provided the solution:
Captives were valuable and they transported themselves.

The Shoshone quickly

began raiding for captives on a wide and continuous scale (Secoy 1953: 38).
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Consequently, the Comanche assured themselves an additional source of
captives for the New Mexican slave market.
As the Comanche replaced the Apache on the Southern plains they also
became the principal partners in the Spanish trade.

This trade followed

a seasonal pattern which had undoubtedly originated long before the Spanish
arrival.

The trade fairs were held twice a year.

Once in the spring from

April to June and then again in September (Hyde 1959: 102).

Taos remained

the center of trade (Kenner 1969: 26), undoubtedly owing to its proximity
to the Colorado plains.

The spirit of these fairs is evident in a brief

but vivid description of a trade fair:
When the Indian trading embassy comes to these governors
and their alcaldes, here prudence forsakes them...because
the Fleet is in. The Fleet being, in this case, some two
hundred, or at the very least, fifty tents of barbarous
Indians. (Jackett quoted in Kenner 1969: 37).
The decade from 1730 to 1740 was a period in intensified slave trade
in New Mexico.

The Comanche— via their trade with the Shoshone, were increasing

the supply at the trade fairs.
by the Spanish.

The slave trade was viewed with mixed emotions

The government condoned the practice since the New Mixican

economy was heavily dependent upon such trade.

On a more moralistic note

it was generally thought that being a Spanish slave was better than being a
Comanche captive.

The Church conclueded that while slavery was evil this

particular situation had "potential means to save souls.”

The slaves could

be educated and brought into the fold of the Church (Kenner 1969: 38).
Not all priests were in favor of the traffic in captives.

Fray Serrano

wrote a vivid if not condemning description of Comanche trading practices:
It is the truth that when these barbarian bring a certain
number of Indian women to sell, among them many young maidens
and girls, before delivering them to the Christians who buy
them, if they are ten years old or over, they deflower and
corrupt them in the innumerable assemblies of barbarians
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and Catholics...without considering anything but their
unbridled lust and brutal shamelessness, and saying to
those who buy them, with heathen impudence: "Now you
can take her— now she is good" (Hackett quoted in
Kenner 1969: 39).
In addition to the economic necessity of the Indian trade, the
Spanish were concerned with the continuous reports of French attempts
to reach the Soutwest.

With the New Mexican military structure largely

ineffective, the government sought to maintain some form of alliance with
the Comanche, since with a dependence on Spanish trade goods the Comanche
could be an effective barrier against French encroachment.

In fact, the

Comanche had been partially responsible for keeping the French confined
to the eastern periphery of the southern plains.

During their first

three decades of war with the Apache the Comanche had generally been
opposed to French traders, since they might have supplied the Apache
with firearms (Richardson 1933: 58-59).

The Apache had received a few

firearms from French sources during this period, but the supply was
insufficient to alter the Apaches deteriorating situation (Secoy 1953: 81)
By the mid-1740's the Comanche had completely broken the Apache and
were eager to open trade with the French.

In 1740 the French negotiated

a trade alliance between the Comanches and the allied Caddoans of eastern
Oklahoma and Northeast Texas.

The Caddoans had been trading with the

French since 1720 and had a plentiful supply of firearms (Secoy 1953: 82).
With this trade alliance the Comanche were assured a cource of firearms
which the Spanish had rigidly denied to all natives.

The establishment

of this trade route marked the beginning of increased Comanche attacks on
New Mexico and population shift from the Colorado plains to the southern
plains.
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The Comanche made several attacks along the New Mexican frontier
taking captives, horses, mules and plunder.

In 1744 and again in 1746,

they attacked Pecos and Galesteo, driving their attack to within twenty
miles of Santa Fe (Kenner 1969: 41).

The severity of these attacks

prompted the Spanish settlers, who under law had no political power,
to demand protection.

The governor was forced to request authorization

for a military expedition.

Mexico City considered the request and eighteen

months later gave approval.

The governor of New Mexico was then ordered

to confine military action to decisions of whether hostile Indians should
or should not be allowed to trade at Taos (Hyde 1969: 104-105).

The New

Mexican officials decided that since New Mexico needed the trade and the
Comanche would benefit from the Christian influence at the trade fairs
they would be allowed to trade (Richardson 1933: 57).

The Spanish had

given the Comanche a free license to raid New Mexico and maintain open
trade at the same time.

A part of their decision undoubtedly rested on

reports that thirty-three Frenchmen were within two days travel of Taos,
trading firearms to the Comanche (Hyde 1959: 105-106).
After 1740 there was a definite movement of Comanche groups into the
Southern plains.

Prior to 1740, Comanche raiders and traders had come into

the Taos area from the north.

After 1740 raiders also came from the east

as far south as the Santa Fe area (Hyde 1959: 103).

Undoubtedly, the

initial movement was begun by the Penane (Wasp) band who had moved south
and east out of their Colorado territory in order to facilitate trade with
the French supplied Caddoans.
by other "newer" Comanche.

The Colorado plains were probably occupied

The Arkansas River running through the

Colorado plains seems to have been a convenient boundary.

To the north
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of this river were the Shoshone, adjacent to and south of the Arkansas
River there were Comanche.

Since the Shoshone were virtually identical

both linguistically and culturally to the Comanche, a Shoshone merely had
to reach the river to become a Comanche.

It is quite probable that those

Shoshone living directly north of the Arkansas River would move south in
order to acquire, first hand, the same horses and goods the Comanche
brought to trade.
The only evidence which tends to support this theory is the reports
of Comanche survivors from a raiding party who made an unsuccessful raid
on Taos in 1751.

The "Comanche" captives stated that they were from two

bands who had come from north of the Arkansas River.

This raiding party

only had six guns among five hundred warriors (Hyde 1959: 110).

At best

this could be interpreted as a general shifting southward of the Shoshone
after the opening of the southern gun trade.

It also indicates that not

all the Comanche were receiving an abundant supply of firearms.
There is also some possibility that the sudden Comanche attacks on
the Ute in 1749 may have been the work of these new "Comanche" who were
determined to gain access to the New Mexican settlements.

The Ute occupied

the region north of New Mexico and had, until 1749, launched raids into
New Mexico from this direction.

In 1750 the raids stopped, and the Ute

began asking Spanish officials for protection from the Comanche.

The

Ute location was right for an invasion by Shoshone already mounted via
the Comanche trade.

The conditions were also right, but no Spanish records

indicate the appearance of a new group of Comanche.

But then again, the

Spanish had failed to recognize the first Comanche invasion in 1705.
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The Comanche raided the New Mexican frontier with seasonally
patterned regularity.

Raiding every summer, the Comanche accumulated

horses, captives and plunder which were traded to the Caddoans for
French guns.

Returning to New Mexico the raiding would continue; then,

in the fall they would travel to Taos for more trading.

As the Comanche

increased their horse herds, they began selling them at the trade fairs.
As early as 1760, they were reported to have brought horses to trade, and
in the 1770's they were bringing "a thousand or more animals" to Taos
(Kenner 1969: 37).

The Spanish were quite willing to buy these horses

since Comanche raids had drastically reduced the Spanish herds.

The

Spanish maintained their ban on selling firearms to natives, but by 1760
the Comanche were offering guns to the Spanish.

Though there are no accounts

of how many guns were offered, the record indicates that it was a consider
able number and that it was still going on in 1776 when Fray Domingue stated
that the Comanche sold "good guns" (Thomas 1932: 317).
The Comanche were also busy ransoming Spanish captives at the trade
fairs.

The Comanche were quick to realize that the Spanish paid large

ransoms for the safe return of their own people.

The following account

illustrates the Comanche's raiding priorities as well as the Spanish govern
ments attitude toward aggressive behavior on the part of their appointed
officials.

In August of 1760, the Comanche attacked a Spanish ranch house

near Taos where many settlers had gone for protection.
the men and captured fifty-six women and children.
arrived in Taos ready to trade.

The Comanche killed

In 1761 these Comanche

The Governor, convinced that a hard stand

would end the Comanche attacks, refused to allow the Comanche any trade
until the captives had been returned.

The Comanche did gain entrance to
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the fair by permission of the alcalde upon the Comanche promise to "ransom"
seven of the captives.

The Governor, evidently not knowing of this deal,

had the Comanche leaders arrested.

The Comanche attacked and the Governor,

anticipating such a reaction, had cannon loaded with grapeshot waiting.
After the fight the Governor reported a victory claiming 400 Comanche
killed and 300 taken prisoner.

For his victory the Governor was replaced.

The Comanche captives were released and open trade renewed (Kenner 1969:
43-44) .

The official policy stated that instead of attacking the Comanche,

he should have seized the opportunity to make peace and recover the Spanish
prisoners (Richardson 1933: 58).
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THE TEXAS FRONTIER

The Comanche had concentrated their raiding activities on the New
Mexican territory throughout the first half of the 18th century.

In

fact, the Spanish settlements in Texas had reported no Comanche in that
area as late as 1756.

The only Indian problems Texas reported prior to

that date were with the Apache (Hyde 1959: 114).

a 1757 the Spanish began

constructing a mission on the San Saba River, near the present town of
Menard, Texas.

The mission and fort were completed by the priests complained

that the Apache, for whom it was built, were more interested in receiving
gifts than religion.
the Apache fled.

Rumors of approaching Comanche were circulated and

In March, 1758, the Comanche attacked, killing the priests

and burning the mission (Webb 1931: 127-128).

It was reported that a

combined force of Comanche and Caddoans totalling two thousand xjarriors
attacked the mission (Hodge 1907: II 705).
The Texas officials were quicker to react than their New Mexican
counterparts.

In 1759 Colonel Diego Ortiz Parilla led a force of six hundred

men complete with two bronze cannons against the Comanche and their Caddoan
allies.

Parilla's force destroyed a small Caddoan Village near the Red

River, in the present Ringgold neighborhood.

The town was fortified: The

Indians were flying a French flag, carrying French weapons, and reportedly
using French military tactics.

The Spanish attacked the town, but even with

their cannons they could not force their way in.

Eventually the Spanish

force broke and ran, leaving their cannons and most of their baggage behind
(Webb 1931: 128-129).

The estimated number of Caddoans and Comanche defending

the fortified village was placed at 6,000 (Hyde 1959: 115).

The defeat of

32
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this Texas force left the Comanche clear access to the Texas settlement
and beyond into Old Mexico.
The Comanche continued to alternate between raiding and trading until
about 1/65 when raiding on New Mexican settlements decreased.

The deereas

in raids conincides with the fall of New France in 1763 and the subsequent
end of the Caddoan based gun trade.
single source of European goods.

The Comanche were again faced with a

The horse and slave exchange continued

with their Shoshonean relatives and with New Mexico.

This peace lasted

until 1768 when the Comanche found a new source of firearms, supplied by
independent French traders through Taovayas middlemen (Kenner 1969: 45).
The period between 1768 and 1780 was a confusing series of Comanche
raids and trade fairs, resulting in the virtual destruction of the New
Mexican frontier.

It is beyond the scope of this study to recount litera

ture pertaining to this period except to illustrate the severity of the
Comanche attacks, the Spanish response, and to discuss the factors respons
ble for the Comanche attacks.
In 1768, the Comanche concentrated their attacks on the Ojo Caliente
area, forty miles north of Santa Fe.

These attacks were so severe that

settlers began abandoning their land even under penalty of fines and forfe
tures of property (Kenner 1969: 46).

In 1770 the citizens of Taos were

forced to abandon their plaza and take refuge in the Taos Pueblo during a
Comanche attack.

In 1772, five hundred Comanche attacked Taos, and others

attacked Pecuris and Galesteo.

The Governor of New Mexico then reported

the sequel to such raids:
The Comanche did not find it inconvenient to present themselves
peacefully at Taos to trade their buffalo skins, horses, mules,
some guns and captives in exchange for bridles, awls, knives,
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colored cloth and maize from which the settlers of the
province benefited.
(Thomas quoted Kenner 1969: 47)
The Comanche traded peacefully for a year, then resumed raiding.
The Spanish resisted the initial attacks, but the Comanche swarmed into
the province "by all routes" and quickly stamped out effective resistance.
The problem the Spanish had was the lack of weapons and horses.

A survey

indicated that there were only six hundred guns and one hundred-fifty
pairs of pistols in all of New Mexico at the time (Thomas quoted in
Kenner 1969: 47-48).

As late as 1782 an edict was issued by the Governor

directing all citizens to provide themselves with bows and arrows within
two months (Simmons 1968: 149).
Comanche raids.

The lack of horses was the result of the

In 1775, the New Mexican Governor requested from Mexico

City at least fifteen hundred head of horses, warning that if they were
not delivered, the province would be desolated.

The request was approved

but the horses were never sent (Kenner 1969: 48).
Besides the loss of lives and property, the New Mexicans soon faced
stravation.

Farmers were afraid to tend their fields; seige conditions

prevailed throughout New Mexico.

In one account it is reported that some

people who remained in the Pueblos were reduced to eating horse and cow
hides and roasting old shoes.
been reduced by half.

By 1776 the population of Galesteo had

At Pecos the population had dropped from four

hundred forty-six in 1750 to two hundred sixty-nine in 1776 (Thomas quoted
in Kenner 1969: 49).
The question of why the Comanche carried on almost con^-nuous war
from 1768 to 1780- when they had prior to the former date

reached a

stable and lucrative trading/raiding arrangement with New Mexico, consti
tutes a problem.

Part of the answer was the renewed French gun trade
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along- the Red River.
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But the unprecedented pressure of their attacks

indicates other factors.

It is highly probable that this period marked

the invasion of a third wave of Comanche from the north.

From the mid-

1730's the northern Shoshone had enjoyed a position of military supremacy,
via their trade with the Comanche.

They raided indiscriminantly for

captives to perpetuate this trade, and thereby succeeded in alienating
themselves from surrounding tribes.

This was not a disadvantage for the

Shoshone as long as they maintained a monopoly on the horse trade. Gradually,
by theft and trade, the surrounding tribes, i.e., Blackfoot, Atsina,
Sursi, Assenaloine and Plains Cree, acquired sufficient horses.

After 1763,

independent traders began reaching the plains with supplies of firearms.
The Shoshone, having isolated themselves, were cut off from this gun supply
by their enemies who had quickly armed themselves and taken the offensive
(Secoy 1953: 51-52).

The result was a gradual shift in military supremacy.

The Shoshone were forced to take the defensive and were gradually pushed
off the northern plains.
Undoubtedly some of the retreating Shoshone moved south to avoid the
increased pressure or to participate in the Red River gun trade.

With the

Comanche bands who had moved southeast to Taos attacking the central region,
and the new arrivals raiding into northern New Mexico from across the
Arkansas River, there is little doubt of why the raids were intensified.
Spanish records indicate that as late as 1785, a Comanche group known as
the Yupes were living far in the north (Hyde 1959: 153).

This group of

Comanche was the Yapaine or Yap-eaters, who during the 19th century, ranged
across the Colorado plains south of the Arkansas River (Wallace and Hoebel
1952: 27-28).
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The raiding continued until 1780 when a smallpox epidemic broke out
in Texas and quickly spread through the southern plains.

This epidemic

killed over five thousand Pueblo Inidans in New Mexico alone.

It is not

know how badly the Comanche were affected, but it must have hit them hard
since raiding began to decrease, and they began asking for peach (Hyde
1959: 164-165).

Another factor in the Comanche desire for peace may have

been a desire for a permanent trade center.

The peace was negotiated, and

the Spanish added an incentive by giving gifts to the Comanche whenever
they came to the settlements.

These presents ranged in value from one to

two pesos for a common warrior to fifteen or twenty pesos for a chief.
These gifts cost the Spanish over five thousand pesos in 1789 (Kenner
1969: 54-55).

The New Mexicans achieved peace, and the Comanche shifted

their raiding activities to Texas and northern provinces of Mexico.
After the defeat of the Parilla expidition in 1758 the Comanche began
attacking the Spanish settlements of San Antonio, Bexar and La Bahia.
They ran off horse herds, took captives and were rapidly desolating the
province.

As usual the Spanish were unable to stop them.

The Comanche

soon extended their raiding southward along the lower Rio Grande River.
The Spanish attempted to make peace and succeeded in reaching an agreement
with the Yapine (Yap-eaters) in 1775 (Richardson 1933: 68-69).

It seems

ironic that these Comanche who were supposed to be above the Arkansas
River were in Texas making treaties with the Spanish.

The treaty was worth

less to the Spanish since the permanent Comanche residents, the Penane (Wasp)
and Kotroleskas continued to raid without let-up (Richardson 1933: 69).
In 1785, the Spanish did succeed in making a treaty with the southern
Comanche.

The Comanche agreed to stop raiding the Texas settlements and
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to bring in all their Spanish captives "in order that they may be redeemed."
The Spanish would establish trade fairs, and each year the chiefs and head
men would be given presents for keeping the peace.

3y 1809 these presents

were costing the Texas province five thousand pesos annually (Richardson
1933: 70-71).
The Comanche raids into northern Mexico bacame more intense and
destructive after 1785 (Roe 1955: 81-82).

The Comanche had shifted their

raiding to less devastated provinces while assuring themselves an outlet
for captives in large numbers.
at the annual trade fairs.
for keeping the peace.

These "goods" were then traded and ransomed

The Chiefs continued to collect their presents

The situation was clearly described by Richardson:

"The Comanche rather than the Spanish had come to be the aggressors"
(1933: 75).

In less than one hundred years, the Comanche had come to domi

nate the entire southern plains.
miles beyond.

Their influence was felt for hundreds of

They would remain dominant until the last decades of the 19th

century but the cultural patterns and behavior which developed and perpetuated
this dominance was shaped by their contact with the Spanish during the 18th
century.
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ANALYSIS OF SPANISH COMANCHE RELATIONSHIP
Comanche dominance of the southern plains was largely facilitated by
three factors.

First, by rapidly acquiring horses and developing a fully

nomadic life style, the Comanche were relatively safe from punitive expedi
tions.

Second, by defeating the semi-sedentary Apache, they eliminated

the only competition for the southern plains.

Third, the Comanche involve

ment in, and perpetuation of, native and European trade networks which
were casual factors in the Comanches rapid equestrian development and de
feat of the Apache.
The Comanches early desire for horses may have been directly related
to the increased mobility and greater hunting efficiency that horses pro
vided.

This motivation was subsequently overshadowed by the development

of trade with the northern Shoshone and the Spanish settlements of New
Mexico.

The Comanche began trading horses to the northern Shoshone.

To

meet the northern trade demand they increased their raids on Apache horse
herds.
The Spanish slave trade offered an opportunity to obtain trade goods
in greater quantities than could be purchased with meat and hides only.
The Comanche quickly recognized the value of captives and began raiding
Apache settlements for prisoners as well as horses.

With the trade value

of horses and captives providing the incentive to intensify raiding and
the Apaches semi-sedentary agricultural phase offering optimum opportunity
for success, the Comanches ultimate victory was greatly accelerated.
The development of the French-supplied Caddoan gun trade in the mid
1740's resulted in a shift in Comanche raiding.

Moving south, the Comanche

began raiding the Spanish settlements along the New Mexican frontier.
38
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Caddoan trade network required horses and captives as payment for French
firearms, and the Comanche found the Spanish settlements and herds easier
targets than the impoverished and scattered Apache bands.
The Spanish were unable to stop the Comanche advance for one basic
reason.

The political and religious policies were controlled by a rigidly

bureaucratic government which, due to its very nature and geographic
distance (Mexico City), proved incapable of grasping the severity of the
situation and consequently proved incapable of making realistic changes
or decisions concerning the Comanche invasion.
There were three specific factors which were partially created, and
further perpetuated by the Spanish bureaucratic structure.

First, the

Spanish military proved inadequate once the Comanche became mounted.
Second, the New Mexican economy was heavily dependent upon the Indian
trade in captives, meat, and hides.

With the Apache defeat, the Comanche

became the principle suppliers and the switch from trading to raiding
endangered the New Mexican economy.

Third, the Spanish were aware of the

French activity on the southern plains and the increased raids and numerous
French firearms among the Comanche reinforced the fear of French invasion.
The Spanish realized that the Comanche were a formidable barrier to any
invading force and sought to win over the supposed French allies.

Since

the Spanish military was inadequate, the Spanish sought peaceful means of
establishing a Comanche alliance.

They allowed unrestricted trade and

liberally distributed presents to the Comanche.

The Spanish were able to

achieve a degree of relief under this system, but as a result, the New
Mexican and Texas settlements became trading centers for horses and Spanish
captives taken in raids into Mexico.
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CONCLUSION

In order to clearly define the nature of Comanche adaptation it is
necessary to briefly return to the three variables Oliver found absent
in Comanche culture.

The Comanche did not develop tribal congregations,

communal hunts, or I jnt police.

If it may be assumed that the universality

of these institutions among the plains tribes was the result of a shared
ecological factor, specifically the seasonal habits of the buffalo, then
the Comanche either did not share the same environmental conditions or
found alternative methods of exploiting the southern plains environment.
The southern plains have been shown to be extremely drought-prone
during the summer months.
north during these periods.

This often resulted in the buffalo herds migrating
If the Comanche had been solely dependent on

the buffalo the development of communal hunts and hunt police should have
been of prime importance.

The Comanche were not totally dependent on the

buffalo because they had developed an alternative subsistance pattern
around the economic and political policies of the Spanish.
The Comanche quickly developed a predaitory raiding pattern which
to a great extent was enhanced by the Spanish open trade in captives.
They also became dependent on European goods and acclimated to the
Spanish system of annual trade fairs held during the summer.

European

goods and trade fairs became an intricate part of the Comanche social
system.

Raiding became the central focus of Comanche culture, so much

so that horses, captives and plunder were the socially accepted measure
of wealth and power.

Raiding became the summer activity in preparation

for the annual trade fair.

Comanche raiders brought in thousands of
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Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

horses and the Comanche were well known for the sheer size of their herds.
They had so many horses that the horse became the alternative source of
food during the summer raiding season.

By the early 1840's the Comanche

were reported to be eating 20,000 horses annually (Cash and Wolff 1974:23).
This does not imply that the buffalo were not important to the economy of
the Comanche, rather, the use of horses as a alternative food supply allowed
them a degree of adaptive flexability which lessened the need for communal
buffalo hunts and hunt police.

To some degree the use of horses as food

reinforced the raiding pattern, since the attrition rate of their herds
was subsidized by raiding.

By utilizing horses as a food source, the

Comanche were able to maintain the summer raiding pattern necessary for
acquiring the horses, captivies, and plunder with which to facilitate their
trade network.
In essence the Comanche culture was partially orientated toward an
individualized raiding complex which simultaneously raided and traded with
its European progenator.

The Comanche socio-political system remained at

a minimal level because the Spanish influenced provided, on one hand, the
environmental variable necessary to perpetuate that autonomy; and, on the
other hand, the Spanish were militarily, politically and economically in
capable of checking the Comanche because of their autonomy.
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